This paper investigates the determinants of corporate risk-taking. Shareholders with substantial equity ownership in a single company may advocate conservative investment policies due to greater exposure to firm risk. Using large cross-country sample, I find a positive relation between corporate risk-taking and equity ownership of the largest shareholder. This result is entirely driven by investors holding equity ownership in more than one company, thus achieving better portfolio diversification compared to shareholders with a single ownership stake. Stronger legal protection of shareholder rights is associated with more risk-taking, while stronger legal protection of creditor rights reduces risk-taking. JEL classification: G34; G31;
Introduction
Excessive risk-taking is viewed as a contributing factor to the market turmoil that erupted in the United States around mid-2007. Among the most frequently debated channels that have propagated the accumulation of risky exposures are ill-designed compensation policies, capital regulation, originate-to-distribute business model, low short-term interest rates, and others.
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An important agency issue, however, that has received only limited attention by policymakers and scholars is the role of a firm's ownership structure in corporate risk-taking.
From a policy making point of view the effect of shareholders' equity ownership on corporate risk-taking is an important topic for a number of reasons. For example, appetite for risk will result in high-variance asset composition. As pointed out by Wright et al. (1996) , shareholders with significant stakes in a company can shape the nature of its corporate risk-taking, which may affect a firm's ability to compete and eventually its survival. Excessive risk-taking by firms may result in massive bankruptcies, causing repercussion that are felt in the whole economy.
The separation of ownership and control in modern corporations induces an asymmetry of risk-taking and rewards between managers and shareholders. Managers may avoid risky projects to secure their non-diversifiable human capital in firms, while owners may choose risky projects to increase the value of their equity holdings. Under the separation of ownership and control, one way to alter a firm's risk-return profile is external shareholders to exercise significant voting power. Contrary to the notion of dispersed ownership in modern corporations, La Porta et al. (1999) highlight that large corporations have shareholders with sizable ownership stakes which potentially resides the control 1 Policy makers agreed that compensation policies have allowed short-term benefits to be translated into huge compensation increases while there was no liability for long-term losses (See Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group III, "Containing Systematic Risk: The Road to Reform," August 2008) . Weaknesses in bank capital framework have indirectly encouraged banks to finance their risky activities with short-term borrowing which has also been seen as a (temporary) mechanism to mitigate the shareholder-manager problem in banks (Kashiap et al. (2008) ). The Financial System Review of December 2008 summarizes that the lack of transparency of the originate-to-distribute business model made it difficult for investors to evaluate the risks and the associated losses from these exposures. Ioannidou et al. (2007) examine the impact of short-term interest rates on banks' risk-taking. The authors conclude that low interest rates encourage ex-ante risk-taking; banks give more loans to borrowers with weaker credit scores in times of low interest rates, and banks do not price these extra risks.
in their hand. A study by Holderness (2009) casts doubt that ownership in the US is less concentrated than elsewhere.
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Although large shareholders are ubiquitous their role in corporate risk-taking has received limited attention in the literature, unlike managerial ownership (Denis et al. (1997) , Amihud and Lev (1981) ), the structure of CEO incentives (Coles et al. (2006) ) and legal protection of investors (John et al. (2008) ).
This paper explores the effect of equity ownership of the largest shareholders on corporate risk-taking by using a large cross-section of companies from 38 countries for the period [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . The literature offers conflicting predictions about the impact of shareholders with sizable ownership on risk-taking that is a firm's earnings volatility. On the one hand, shareholders with a sizable ownership stake have powerful incentives to collect information and monitor managers for the purpose of profit maximization through the promotion of firm risk-taking (Shleifer and Vishny (1986) ). Similar explanation by Amihud and Lev (1981) is that managers have incentives to reduce their high exposure to idiosyncratic risk. However, they will not be allowed to take risk-reduction activities in owner-controlled firms in which external shareholders have incentives to take more risks. Thus, according to this argument risk-taking is expected to be greater in firms with large shareholders than in firms with dispersed ownership due to the weakened role of risk-averse managers. On the other hand, shareholders with a large block of shares in one company are expected to have lower utility of risk-taking than it could be if the shareholders had a (well-diversified) portfolio. In addition, large shareholders may be risk-averse because they value their private benefits of control and in order to secure them they will invest in safe projects (John et al. (2008) ).
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Shareholders face a trade-off between (value-enhancing) risk-taking and the cost of forgone diversification. When ignoring the role of "underdiversificaiton," I find evidence of a positive relation between equity ownership and corporate risk-taking. Equity ownership concentration is the percentage of equity ownership of the largest shareholder and 2 The prevalence of large blockholders is also studied by Shleifer and Vishny (1986) , Morck et al. (1988 ), La Porta et al. (1999 , Claessens et al. (2000) and others. See Morck et al. (2005) for a recent review of various forms of ownership control mechanisms in corporations around the world. Dual-class shares, cross-ownership and pyramid structures lead to divergence between ownership and control.
risk-taking is measured with the variation in country-and industry-adjusted corporate earnings over total assets. The intuition is that shareholders with large stakes exercise their control to affect the volatility of company earnings over time. This paper further investigates the mechanism through which risk-taking occurs, that is the role of group affiliation. It appears that 42% of the firms are affiliated to a group, defined as a structure comprised of a large number of companies having the same largest shareholder. The positive relationship between ownership and risk-taking is merely driven by the firms affiliated to a group. Moreover, this effect is prevalent only for controlling shareholders, i.e. with equity ownership more than 10%.
Shareholders with large ownership stakes may not achieve their desired level of risk through portfolio diversification. Large stakes, which are controlling blocks, are often characterized by privately negotiated trading, the value of which depends on private benefits of control. Hence, owners holding such stakes may not easily diversify away their ownership portfolio. Under the assumption that groups provide diversification opportunities, shareholders in a group are less exposed to firm-specific risk and thus might have incentives to promote greater risk-taking.
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Relying on the assumption that unaffiliated shareholders are undiversified and thus exposed to firm risk, it is expected to see them invest in less risky projects. These theoretical arguments suggest that group affiliation might be an important factor for risk-taking incentives of shareholders.
The key findings are as follows. First, corporate risk-taking and ownership are positively related on average. This result is robust to various variable definitions. Laeven and Levine (2009) also study risk-taking and ownership in banks and document a positive relationship. However, their study do not examine the portfolio of ownership stakes. Second, after accounting for a shareholder's participation in a business group, I find that (i) risk-taking is lower in group-affiliated companies and (ii) the relationship between risk-taking and ownership is positive only for shareholders that participate in the group; for the rest, it is negative and insignificant depending on the specification. For example, one standard deviation increase in ownership of shareholders that participate in a 4 The literature on business groups in emerging markets suggests that business groups promote riskreduction opportunities through risk-sharing (e.g., Khanna and Yafeh (2005) , Khanna and Yafeh (2007) Third, I analyze the influence of shareholders and creditors protection on corporate risk-taking. La Porta et al. (2000) posit that strong investor protection makes it more difficult for shareholders to secure their private benefits through conservative corporate activity, which forces them to pursue risky projects. I document that stronger shareholders' rights are positively linked to risk-taking, and stronger creditor rights are negatively linked to risk-taking. The former result is consistent with John et al. (2008) , and the latter-with Acharya et al. (2008) .
The above results continue to hold after accounting for possible endogeneity of the decision of the largest shareholders to invest in more than one firm and in such a way to participate in a group. First, I control for unobservable group fixed effects that might affect risk-taking. Second, I apply Heckman's correction to control for self-selection bias induced by the decision of firms to participate in a group. Third, I estimate a two-stage model. At the first stage, the residuals of time-varying corporate earnings are retrieved, and at the second stage the standard deviations of the residuals is regressed on ownership and firm-specific controls. The results are also robust to applying quantile estimation technique and a number of additional robustness checks. This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, the analyzes sheds light on the role of a relatively unexamined factor that affects corporate risk-takingownership structure. There is large literature investigating ownership and risk-taking in banks (e.g., Laeven and Levine (2009), Gonzalez (2005) ), while only a few studies focus on non-financial firms (Gadhoum and Ayadi (2003) , Wright et al. (1996) ). Second, I account for the equity ownership portfolio of the largest shareholder. Examining a specific type of groups, consisted of firms that share the same largest shareholders, allows to view groups not only as a diversification mechanism, but also as a control-enhancing 5 Corporate diversification is measured by the number of industries in which firms in the group operate. Similarly geographic diversification is the number of countries in which firms in the group operate, and ownership diversification is the number of firms in which the largest shareholders has a sizable stake (10%).
mechanism. Shareholders exercise control through their first-rank stakes in each firm in the group. As far as I am aware, this is the first study to examine simultaneously the impact of stock ownership and group affiliation on risk-taking. Khanna and Yafeh (2005) examine the role of group affiliation on risk-taking, however, their work does not explore the role of ownership structure. In addition, I account separately for corporate, geographic and ownership diversification of groups. Third, I contribute to the growing literature on law and finance by examining the impact of investor protection indexes on corporate risk-taking (La Porta et al. (1998 ), La Porta et al. (1999 , John et al. (2008) ).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I briefly discuss related literature and develop the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data, variables and descriptive statistics. Sections 4 and 5 present the estimates of risk-taking regressions with and without group affiliation. Section 6 addresses the issue of having powerful shareholders. Section 7 presents various robustness checks and Section 8 concludes.
Related Literature and Hypotheses Development
The is research on equity ownership of insiders. Insiders derive utility from reducing the firm-specific idiosyncratic risk they face. One way to decrease exposure to this type of risk is to engage in diversifying activities, which is viewed as perquisites in the context of the agency model. Amihud and Lev (1981) suggest that managers will advocate for conglomerate mergers to decrease their exposure to "employment risk" (i.e., risk of losing job, reputation). Managers with higher equity ownership will have higher incentives for risk-reduction, which justifies more active diversification by these managers. Both Amihud and Lev (1981) and May (1995) find support of this hypothesis. On the contrary, Denis et al. (1997) argue that because of agency costs related to diversification, managers with high equity ownership not invest in these companies. The authors find a negative relation between the level of diversification and equity ownership which supports the their agency cost hypothesis.
These studies do not specifically derive predictions about the relationship between risk-taking and ownership of external shareholders. The underlying assumption is that external shareholders are well diversified and they will undertake risky projects. This assumption is tightly linked with the understanding that ownership structure is dispersed, i.e., comprised of shareholders with small ownership stakes. Modern corporations around the world have different ownership structures. A great number of studies show that U.S. corporations are usually widely dispersed and even if they have large blockholders they are much less common than in other countries (Morck et al. (1988) , Shleifer and Vishny (1986) ). Outside US, large shareholders are prevalent and they exert control through having ownership in a large group of firms. Holderness (2009) The literature suggests two oppositive views of the relation between corporate risktaking and equity ownership. One argument that justifies a positive relationship between risk-taking and ownership is associated with monitoring. It is well recognized that atomistic shareholders do not have incentives to monitor the manager, which aggravates the shareholder-manager agency conflict (Grossman and Hart (1980) , Shleifer and Vishny (1986) ). Shareholders with large equity stakes in the company, however, have incentives to monitor the manager with the purpose of value maximization through taking more risk projects (Shleifer and Vishny (1986) ). One of the purposes of monitoring is to reduce information asymmetry between managers and owners resulting in more accurate alignment of managerial actions and pay. Active (costly) monitoring is associated with greater precision in detecting the most relevant information for constructing an optimal CEO contract.
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Large shareholders might not compensate managers for risk-taking but rather they may bear the risks themselves. So, monitoring reduces the information asymmetry between manager and shareholders at the cost of a risk transfer from managers to shareholders presumably without compromising performance incentives. Shareholders with incentives to monitor will end up taking more risk. Wright et al. (1996) hypothesize that institutional owners exert a significant and positive influence on risk-taking because of their incentive to increase firm value through 6 The informativeness principle implies that any signal that can be obtained trough monitoring should be used in the compensation contract if it contains additional information not included in the profit (Holmstrom (1979) ).
promotion of risk-taking activities. Accounting simultaneously for the impact of insider and blockholders' ownership, the authors do not find a significant relationship between the latter and risk-taking. Gadhoum and Ayadi (2003) test whether ownership structure of Canadian firms is negatively related to firm risk. The authors find a nonlinear relationship between ownership and risk-risk-taking is high at low and high levels of ownership. John et al. (2008) argue that undiversified large shareholders, assumed to be prevalent in countries with low investor protection, take less risky projects. Also, shareholders with significant ownership stake might be reluctant to take more risk due to securing their private benefits of control. For example, they might desire to maintain good reputation and/or to enhance control (Jensen and Meckling (1976) ).
Shareholders face a trade-off between taking (value-enhancing) risky projects and incurring costs of forgone diversification. On the one hand large equity ownership motivate investors to be risk-takers, on the other hand they are exposed to idiosyncratic fluctuations, which makes them risk-averse. Portfolio theory suggests that holding stock only in one company makes investors more risk-averse compared to holding diversified portfolio that removes the nonsystematic risk. In this paper, I emphasize the role of shareholders' equity portfolios in risk-taking. I examine whether shareholders shareholders change their risk-taking behavior depending on group participation, i.e., diversification. An analysis of a shareholder's portfolio allows for better understanding of the proclivity to risk-taking.
The benefits of group participation are that shareholders offer both risk-reduction and group-related private benefits Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) . It is established that being part of a group might incur some costs as well. Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995) show, among others, that diversified firms trade at a discount. This paper also emphasizes the role of investor protection on corporate risk-taking. Jensen and Meckling (1976) recognize the role of the legal system in mitigating agency problems. In addition to equity ownership, the protection of minority shareholders and creditor rights might influence risk-taking behavior of the top shareholders. (2000) point that among protected shareholder rights are "those to receive dividends on pro-rata terms, to vote for directors, to participate in shareholders' meetings, to subscribe to new issues of securities on the same terms as the insiders, to sue directors or the majority for suspected expropriation, to call extraordinary shareholders' meetings etc. Laws protecting creditors's rights largely deal with bankruptcy and reorganization procedures, and include measures that enable creditors to work by John et al. (2008) show that better investor protection leads to riskier (but value enhancing) investments. Large shareholders may not be risk-taking because they want to preserve their private benefits of control.
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La Porta et al. (2000) propose that strong legal protection makes securing private benefits more costly. It is expected under these conditions that shareholders will have greater risk-taking incentives that might forsake private benefits. In countries with strong legal protection benefits of control are expected to be lower, which might indirectly increase risk-taking. So, strong investor protection might be positively related to risk-taking. Acharya et al. (2008) propose that creditor rights protection might affect risk-taking.
Better protected creditors might increase bankruptcy costs which motivates shareholders to avoid insolvency. One way to achieve this is by engaging in conservative investment policies.
Research Focus
The main focus of this paper is the effect of ownership of the top shareholders on corporate risk-taking. Shareholders face a trade-off between risk-taking and cost of forgone diversification, which has not been examined in the literature. I address two following questions. First, is higher equity ownership associated with greater risk-taking? Second, does shareholders' diversification with stocks in multiple companies affect risk-taking?
Third, do better protection of investors' rights affect top shareholder's risk-taking. After controlling for other factors affecting risk-taking, I posit that equity ownership of large shareholders is positively related to corporate risk-taking. The results further suggest that only shareholders with a portfolio of shares in more than one company have a proclivity for undertaking high-risk activities. Strong investor protection increases risk-taking, while creditor rights protection decreases it.
repossess collateral, to protect their seniority, and to make it harder for firms to seek court protection in reorganization." 
Definition of Variables
The OSIRIS data reports the percentage of ownership for each shareholder only once for the period [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . Ownership is measured by the summation of the percent of direct and indirect cash flow rights. Depending ont he specification, ownership less than 10% is coded at zero.
A business group is defined as a set of legally separated firms that have a common shareholder.
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An important feature of the definition of a business group in this paper is that each firm in the group has a common shareholder regardless of the size of her equity stake. If a top shareholder of one firm has a stake in another firm where the stake is not ranked as the largest one, these two companies are not classified as belonging to a group.
However, if the stakes in both firms are the largest, then these two firms belong to the same group. This definition is somewhat different from previously used definitions in the literature that do not account the ranking of the ownership stake. By considering groups that are consisted only of the largest ownership stakes in firms, one can examine the role of shareholders in corporate decision making.
A proxy for risk-taking is the volatility of corporate earnings. In particular, I consider country-and industry-adjusted dispersion of firm-level earnings over the sample period
2003-2006:
where 10 The anti-director rights is "formed by adding one when: (1) the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote to the firm; (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the general shareholders' meeting; (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities in the board of directors is allowed; (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place; (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an extraordinary shareholders' meeting is less than or equal to 10%; (6) shareholders have preemptive rights that can be waived only by a shareholders' vote. The index ranges from zero to six. The creditor rights index is defined as a summation of four indexes defined in La Porta et al. (1998) . The index ranges from 0 to 4. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the distribution of the number of firms across countries.
Summary Statistics
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The number of firms per country, reported in column (1), varies significantly.
For example, the total number of firms in Columbia is 9 and in Japan it is 2,296. The total number of groups is 1,070 comprised of 6,936 firms.
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The data shows that 43% of all firms are part of a group, suggesting that the largest shareholder has equity ownership in more than one firm in the sample. 12% of all groups are located in Japan, 10% in Canada, 8.6% in the United Kingdom and 6.14% in Taiwan. Further investigations show that 44% of all firms in the United Kingdom are in a group, similarly 90% in Japan, 56%
in Canada, 50% in the US and 20% in Taiwan.
The risk-taking measure, RISK, ranges from a low of 4.54% in Taiwan to a high of 13.83% in Australia. On average, the most levered firms as measured by book leverage are in Thailand, Chile and Portugal.
Equity ownership of the largest shareholder also varies substantially across countries.
In Germany the average percent of shareholdings is 54.6, while in Japan it is only 10.33.
The correlation between the risk-taking variable (RISK) and ownership is 0.02% and it is statistically significant (not tabulated). The correlation between RISK and anti-director rights is 13%, and between RISK and creditor rights the correlation is negative -10%. Table 2 presents the results of mean and median comparisons for a number of characteristics of affiliated and non-affiliated firms. The first two columns show means and medians for all firms. The average ownership stake of the largest shareholders is 25.82% while the median is 15.2%. A fraction of large firms contribute to the discrepancy between mean and median size as reported in million dollars of net sales. The comparison of affiliated and unaffiliated firms shows that the average equity ownership stakes are 15.83% and 33.6% respectively. Tests of the equality of mean and median ownership stakes suggest that equity ownership is significantly higher in unaffiliated firms as com-11 The statistics do not include firms in the financial sector and firms with total assets smaller than $10 million. Also, the sample is restricted by the availability of data on anti-director and creditor rights indexes.
pared to the affiliated ones. Unaffiliated firms are found to be more risky than the affiliated ones. The size of affiliated firms as measured by net sales is significantly larger than that for unaffiliated firms. In terms of profitability, the t-test of equally of means indicates that affiliated and unaffiliated firms do not differ, however the sum-of-ranks test indicates that unaffiliated firms are more profitable than the affiliated ones. Note that this observation is in line with well documented evidence that diversified (affiliated) firms are less profitable compared to stand-alone firms (Berger and Ofek (1995), Lang and Stulz (1994) and Laeven and Levine (2007)).
The risk-adjusted measure of EBITDA/Assets is calculated by dividing the average profitability measure EBITDA/Assets by the standard deviation of corporate earnings (RISK). The the risk-adjusted returns are lower for the unaffiliated firms compared to affiliated ones. The unaffiliated firms rely more on debt than the affiliated ones.
To describe groups, Table 3 shows statistics for various group-specific characteristics that capture different aspects of group heterogeneity. Namely these measures are the number of firms in a group, the number of ultimate owners (UO) in a group (at the 10% level), the number of different business segments as measured by 2-digit SIC, and the number of different countries in which firms operate. On average, a group is comprised of almost 5.73 companies. Groups are operating in 3.9 distinct 2-digit SIC industries.
The average number of firms operating in different countries, a measure of international diversification is 2, and the average number of ultimate owners, a measure of ownership concentration in the group is 2.10.
The simple correlation matrix in Table 3 shows that risk is negatively related with all diversification measures and positively related with ownership concentration captured by the number of ultimate owners. The correlation between the average number of UO in a group and all other diversification measures is weak suggesting that these measure capture different aspects of diversification.
Basic Regressions
Specification (1) allows to test the effect of ownership on corporate earnings volatility.
The dependent variable, RISK, is the standard deviation of country-and industryadjusted EBITDA/Assets of firm i. Ownership is percentage of direct and indirect equity ownership of the largest shareholder. If the largest owner has less than 10% ownership, the value is coded at zero. Table 1 , the number of firms per country differs substantially. To avoid the possibility that this particular sampling feature affects the results, each individual firm observation is weighted with the inverse of the number country observations (sampled firms) in a country.
14 Risk and ownership might be jointly determined by common unobservable factors which violates the consistency of the OLS estimator. As suggested by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) ownership structure arises endogeneously within the firm. One way to address this issue is to use an instrumental variable that is correlated with ownership structure and uncorrelated with risk-taking. Potential candidate variable is the average ownership of other firms in the same industry group and country.
To study how the group affiliation affects risk-taking, I augment equation (1) with a group dummy variable and an interaction term of ownership and the group dummy:
Group takes the value one if a firm belongs to a group, and zero otherwise. It is recognized that firms that choose to participate in a group may not be a random sample of firms. This is confirmed in the data by seeing differences between affiliated and unaffiliated firms (Table 2) . If a firm's decision to diversivy is related to risk-taking, i.e.
if Group and 1i are correlated, the Group estimate will be biased and inconsistent. To address this issue, I first estimate Heckman self-selection model which explicitly models the decision to diversify and incorporates its effect into the risk-taking regression. The biases in the estimates ρ and ξ are attenuated. Second, I estimate two-stage model that first takes into considerations the firm-specific factors that affect the average earnings and then evaluates the impact of ownership on the risk-taking at the second stage. Third, group fixed effects are used, assuming that all the unobserved heterogeneity leading to correlation between the error term and Group variable is constant over time. Table 4 , column (1), presents the estimates of regressions of country-and industryadjusted earnings volatility on ownership. In this specification ownership is defined as an indicator variable taking the value of one for ownership stake higher than 10% and zero otherwise. The coefficient on the ownership dummy indicates that the presence of a shareholder with ownership larger than 10% has a positive and significant effect on firm risk-taking. Firms with large shareholders exhibit 0.18% significantly higher earnings' volatility than firms without such type of shareholders. In column (2), ownership is specified as a linear variable. The positive relationship between risk-taking and ownership is preserved-one standard deviation increase in ownership leads to 0.11% increase in the risk-taking proxy. The estimates on sales, earnings and leverage behave as expected.
Larger firms and firms with initially higher earnings are associated with lower operating risks.
The specifications in columns (3) to ( To secure their private benefits, large shareholders abstain from taking risky projects. In countries with strong investor protection, it might be more costly to secure these benefits through passive corporate policies. This will force shareholderholder to switch from conservative risk-taking that secures private benefits to more aggressive risk-taking. Another proxy for investor protection is the index of creditor rights. Acharya et al. (2008) propose that stronger creditor rights make firms engage in risk-reduction. Their argument is that stronger creditor rights induce greater liquidation costs to investors who in response will seek to hedge this type of risk by taking low risk diversifying activities.
In column (3), the coefficient on the anti-director rights index takes a positive sign.
One standard deviation increase in shareholder rights as proxied by anti-director index leads to 0.4% increase in risk-taking above its mean. Similar conclusion follows from column (4) where the ownership is defined as a continuous variable. John et al. (2008) include a richer set of investor protection indexes such as rule of law and accounting disclosure standard. They also find a positive, but not always significant relationship between anti-director rights and corporate risk-taking. Another recent study that accounts for shareholders' protection and bank risk-taking is by Laeven and Levine (2009).
The authors explain the lack of significant link between external ownership and regulation with possible substitution between the availability of large shareholders and strong investor protection (La Porta et al. (1999) , Burkart et al. (2003) ).
The coefficient on the creditor rights index is negative and significant in all specification and suggests that a standard deviation increase in this index is associated with a 1.4% decrease in risk taking for column (3). The negative relationship between creditor rights and risk-taking is in line with Acharya et al. (2008) .
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In untabulated specification, I include a quadratic term of equity ownership as suggested by Gadhoum and Ayadi (2003) and Wright et al. (1996) . While the coefficient on this term is negative and significant in the above mentioned studies, it is negative and insignificant in the current specification. To exclude the possibility that the relationship between ownership and risk-taking might be driven by parent-subsidiary tie, I exclude the fraction of large shareholders than own more than 50% of a firm. The results are preserved.
Column (4) presents results for the sample of firms having top shareholder with more than 10% ownership. The rational for splitting the initial sample is to unveil any potential correlation between large ownership and firm characteristics that might affect 15 Laeven and Levine (2009) do not document a significant relationship between creditor rights and risk-taking. the estimate on ownership. In addition, this separation allows to investigate firms having only a dominant shareholder at the 10% level and suppressing the role of managers. Amihud and Lev (1981) posit that managers are trying to reduce their exposure to firm risk, however, they will not be allowed to do in firms with dominant shareholders.
Unfortunately, due to the lack of information about managerial activity, I cannot infer about the interplay between managerial and owner's risk-taking. This result is also consistent with the view that large shareholders, recognized to have incentives to monitor, take more risky actions to potentially increase firm value (Shleifer and Vishny (1986) ).
Columns (5) and (6) 5 Results: Group Affiliation Table 5 presents results of the effect of group and ownership on risk-taking.
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The model in column (1) is similar to those estimated in Section 4, however, it accounts for the presence of group effect by including a group dummy and the interaction term between the group dummy and the ownership stake of the largest shareholder. The dummy variable, Group, equals one if a firm belongs to a business group and zero otherwise. The estimates show that the coefficient on the group dummy is negative and significant. Firms affiliated to a group enjoy 0.85% lower standard deviation of earnings than unaffiliated firms. This result is similar to Khanna and Yafeh (2005) who examine twelve emerging markets and interpret the negative effect of group on risk-taking as a form of risk-sharing. The estimates of ownership and the interaction term between group affiliation and ownership are of particular interest. The positive sign of the interaction term suggests that owners with large stakes tend to advocate risk-taking only if they are in a group.
One-standard deviation increase in the percent of ownership in groups leads to 0.2% marginal increase in risk-taking. One explanation of the positive marginal effect of ownership on risk-taking conditional on group participation is that shareholders are more diversified in groups. Because diversified owners derive greater utility of risk-taking, they are expected to be more prone to risky actions.
The coefficients on IntialSales, InitialBookLeverage and InitialEBIT DA take the expected signs. As in John et al. (2008) the coefficient on firm size measured by log sales is negative and significant, indicating that large firms exhibit lower risk-taking. Similarly, more initially more profitable firms are associated with lower risk-taking.
I estimate the specification in column (1) separately for group affiliated and standalone firms. The estimation with the partitioned sample removes biases that arise from correlation between the group dummy and other controls. Columns (2) and (3) show the estimates for group affiliated and stand-alone firms respectively. The estimates of ownership clearly confirm that the positive link between ownership and risk-taking is pertinent to the group-affiliated firms. On the contrary, ownership stakes and risk-taking are negatively correlated for stand-alone firms.
Column (4) presents results for controlling shareholders defined at the 10% of ownership. They comprise 70% of the full sample. The effect of ownership on risk-taking conditional on being in a group is valid only for controlling shareholders. This finding suggests that diversification matters for risk-taking conditional on being a controlling shareholder.
The presented results thus far imply that groups affect firm risk-taking in a similar way. It is possible, however, that group characteristics affect risk-taking differently.
Accounting for group characteristics might affect the results presented in Table 5 . To address these issues, I estimate specifications with three different proxies for diversification: (i) corporate diversification is the number of different industry groups (two-digit SIC industries) in which firms in the group operate;
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(ii) the second measure captures geographical diversification by counting the number of different counties in which firms in the group operate; (iii) the third measure captures the degree of ownership concentration of the group and it is measured by the number of firms in which the largest shareholder owns more than 10% equity.
All specifications include the group dummy and its interaction with the equity ownership. These estimates remain similar to the ones in column (1). For all specifications the coefficient on the group affiliation remains negative and statistically significant, and the coefficient on the interaction term with ownership is positive and significant.
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The so-specified proxies for diversification do not affect risk-taking significantly, even though all estimates take the expected signs.
Endogeneity Issues and Groups
The estimated models raise some econometric concerns. As pointed out by Campa and Kedia (2002) , Graham et al. (2002) , Laeven and Levine (2007) , and others, firm-specific factors that drive the decision to be in a group might affect risk-taking. Thus, to evaluate the effect of group diversification on risk-taking per se one has to control for the underlying factors that drive the group decision. Thus, group affiliation should be treated as an endogeneous outcome that optimizes risk-taking, given a set of exogeneous determinants of diversification. Evaluating the impact of group affiliation on risk-taking therefore requires taking into account the endogeneity of the decision to hold shares in a large number of companies.
To control for the endogeneity of the group affiliation decision, I take three steps.
First, I include a set of group fixed effects. The main idea behind this approach is to control for unobserved and unchanging characteristics that are related to both the firm controls and the risk-taking variable. Since, the size of groups varies substantially, from 2 firms in a group up to 300 firms, in order to account for the group fixed effect, I
focus only on a subset of groups that have more than 15 firms in a group (at the 90th percentile). Column (5) in Table 5 presents the OLS estimation for that subsample and column (6) shows the group fixed effect results. The signs of the coefficients on all variables remain similar to the OLS estimates presented in Table 5 , column (1). The estimate on ownership decreases under the fixed effect as compared for the OLS, however, it remains statistically significant. The smaller estimate suggests that group fixed effects and ownership are correlated to some extent, but ownership affect risk-taking separately from unobservable group heterogeneity.
Second, I estimate an endogeneous self-selection model using Heckman (1979) twostep selection procedure. In the first step, I estimate a probit model of whether a firm belongs to a group. The control variables in this specification are the fraction of groups in an industry, industry size, industry and country dummies.
20
These factors are assumed 20 Campa and Kedia (2002) use the fraction of all conglomerate firms in an industry as a proxy for industry attractiveness to account for diversification decisions and its impact on excess value. For a similar approach, see Laeven and Levine (2007) .
to affect group affiliation choice, but not a firm's earnings volatility. In the second stage, risk-taking is the dependent variable and the controls are firm characteristics and the predicted probability of group participation. The estimates are presented in column (7) in Table 5 . The coefficient on ownership is positive and significant, and it is consistent with that found in the previous specifications. The self-selection parameter, lambda is negative and significant, which suggests that factors affecting the decision to be in a group are negatively correlated with risk-taking.
The third test of endogeneity of group affiliation follows Khanna and Yafeh (2005) .
For example, it might be the case that systematically firms with high profits share risks with firms with low profits in the group. To account for this type of endogeneity, a twostage estimation is considered. At the first stage, I allow profitability to be determined by firm characteristics and firm fixed effects. The second stage employs the standard deviation of the residuals from the first stage as a dependent variable. In such a way only the "unexplained" variation in profitability is explored. In addition to the controls from the first stage, the group dummy and its interaction with ownership are included. This approach, labeled by Khanna and Yafeh (2005) the conditional variance of profitability, is quite intuitive. Unexplained changes in profitability are expected to be smaller for groupaffiliated firms. The results are presented in column (8) of Table 5 . Though estimate on the group dummy decreases in magnitude, it preserves the same negative and significant sign. The interaction term between group and ownership is still positive and significant which does not question the conclusion that the percent of ownership of the largest shareholder in group-affiliated firms is positively linked to corporate risk-taking.
In sum, whether using fixed effects, two-stage estimation method, or self-selection model, equity ownership by the largest shareholder is found to be positively related to firm risk-taking.
6 Powerful Shareholders Adams et al. (2005) posit that firms with powerful CEOs will have less extreme performance because they have to compromise with other executives when they disagree, thus achieving a diversification of opinions effect. In a similar spirit, Sah and Stiglitz (1991) argue that performance is less variable when a greater number of executives make decisions. This hypothesis might apply for external shareholders as well. Firms with a single large shareholder might take more extreme decisions due to the lack of other shareholders to oppose the decisions of the largest shareholder. Hence, concentrated ownership might be associated with greater performance variability.
To test this hypothesis, I proxy for "shareholder power" by the differential in ownership stakes between the first and the second largest shareholders. Large deviation signifies the presence of more powerful first shareholder. The results in Table 6 , columns (1)- (3), show that shareholders' power to influence decisions is positively associated with risktaking. This result is coming solely from the sample of affiliated firms (column (2)), which suggests that power is related to group participation. Actually, outside of groups "powerful" shareholders are decreasing firm variability. In the context of Adams et al. (2005) , this results implies that outside of groups a diversification of opinion effect is achieved.
It is difficult to believe that powerful shareholders can "smooth" their decision-making reflected in less variable firm performance. This evidence rather suggests that powerful shareholders have different incentives to take risk depending on group participation than having diversified opinions.
Robustness Checks
Quantile Regressions
The results might be driven by outliers in the distribution of corporate earnings. To address this possibility, I estimate a series of quantile regressions. The advantage of quantile over ordinary least squares regressions is that the former permit the estimation of the marginal effect of a covariate on risk-taking at various points of the distribution. Table 7 presents a series of quantile regressions of risk-taking on the set of controls as specified in equation (1). The results in columns (1) to (4) refer to the group-affiliated firms, and in columns (5) to (8) (5)- (8) show that ownership does affect risk-taking negatively, however, this result is (statistically) preserved only for the firms located at the bottom of the risk-taking distribution of unaffiliated firms. This evidence explains why significance of the negative estimate is not preserved for the specifications.
Subsamples
I investigate whether the results are preserved for different subsamples of firms. Pooling a large set of countries, might mask heterogeneity across countries. In columns (1) to (2) of Table 8 , I exclude sequentially Japan, Canada as countries with high percentage of groupaffiliated firms. After excluding each country separately from the sample, the estimated coefficients do not differ from the results of the full sample. In column (3), I exclude the largest industry that is manufacturing. In column (4), I exclude shareholders classified as mutual funds and banks. In columns (5) and (6) only financial firms are included. They are excluded from all regression due to regulation on ownership and specific risk-taking incentives that merit separate analysis. On average ownership is positively linked to risktaking. The estimate on the group dummy is negative and insignificant (column (6)).
Interestingly, ownership in groups is not positively linked to risk-taking, however outside of group it is positively linked to risk-taking. The specification in column (7) includes all firms and the ownership variable is coded at the 20% as opposed to 10%. The results are preserved. The last column (8) omits the country specific anti-director and creditor rights indexes which are not available for all countries in the sample. The increased sample size does not affect the main estimates of ownership and group affiliation.
Conclusion
This study examines the relationship between ownership and corporate risk-taking. Using data from a large cross-country sample, I find that ownership and risk-taking are positively related. This result, however, is preserved only for owners having shareholdings in more than one company. These shareholders have diversified portfolios, which allows them to pursue risks investment strategies. The results continue to hold after controlling for endogeneity of group affiliation in several different ways. Legal protection also plays a role in risk-taking. Countries with better protection of shareholder rights seem to be associated with more risk-taking, while in countries with strong protection of creditor rights corporate risk-taking is restrained. This paper contributes to the literature on corporate risk-taking by analyzing ownership of the largest shareholder in non-financial companies and to the literature on corporate diversification. I find that industrial, ownership and geographic diversification in groups, all play risk-reduction role, however, the level of diversification does not affect the positive effect of ownership on corporate risk-taking. This paper makes a contribution to the current debate on risk-taking triggered by the financial crisis that started in mid-2007 by suggesting that equity ownership is a valid factor explaining at least part of the risk-taking activity. More importantly, I find that equity ownership plays a role in risk-taking only if owners are diversified and only if they controlling stakes.
Time-series investigation of the way risk-taking and ownership evolve would allow for better understanding of the causes and consequences of risk-taking. Data limitations, however, prevent me from addressing this issue. 
Summary Statistics of Group Specific Characteristics
Groups are defined as a set of firms having common largest shareholder. Number of Industries (Countries) indicates the number of different industries (countries) in which the group operates. Number of ultimate owners (UO) is the number of firms in a group with more than 10% ownership. RISK is the standard deviation of country and industry adjusted corporate earnings. *** denotes 1% significant level, ** denotes 5% significant level, and * denotes 10% significant level. of the largest shareholder in the firm, coded at zero if it is smaller than 10%. EBITDA is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization divided by total assets. Sales is the logarithm of net sales. Book leverage is defined as short term debt plus long term debt over assets. All controls are retrieved for the year of entry in the sample. ADR is anti-director rights index and CR is the creditor rights index. Column (3) includes ADR and CR, unlike column (2). Column (4) covers the sample of firms with largest shareholders having ownership greater than 10%. Column (5) covers the sample of firms with the largest shareholder defined as mutual fund. Column (6) covers the sample of firms with the largest shareholder defined as family. Column (7) shows results from instrumental variable estimation that treats ownership as endogenous variable. Clustered standard errors are reported in brackets. Each firm observation is weighted with the inverse of the number of firms from its domicile country. *** denotes 1% significant level, ** denotes 5% significant level, and * denotes 10% significant level.
Correlation
Contr. Owner
Mutual Funds
Ownership > 10% it is smaller than 10%. All controls are retrieved for the year of entry in the sample. EBITDA/Assets is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization divided by total assets. Sales is the logarithm of net sales. Book leverage is defined as short term debt plus long term debt over assets. ADR is anti-director rights index and CR is the creditor rights index. Column (4) covers a subsample of firms having a controlling shareholders (ownership > 10%). Column (5) covers a subsample of Groups consisted of a large number of firms, OLS estimation. Column (6) covers the same subsample as in Column (5), group fixed effects estimation. Clustered standard errors are reported in brackets. Each firm observation is weighted with the inverse of the number of firms from its domicile country. Country and industry (one-digit SIC code) dummies are not reported. *** denotes 1% significant level, ** denotes 5% significant level, and * denotes 10% significant level.
Full
Affiliated Not Affiliated Contr.Owners OLS Fixed Effects Self-Selection Two-Stages
Group Ownership is the percentage of equity stake of the largest shareholder in the firm, coded at zero if it is smaller than 10%. Book leverage is defined as short term debt plus long term debt over assets. EBITDA/Assest is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization divided by total assets. Sales is the logarithm of net sales. All controls are retrieved for the year of entry in the sample. ADR is anti-director rights index and CR is the creditor rights index. Country and industry (one-digit SIC code) dummies are not reported. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in brackets.
*** denotes 1% significant level, ** denotes 5% significant level, and * denotes 10% significant level.
Affiliated Firms
Non-Affiliated Firms is smaller than 10%. Book leverage is defined as short term debt plus long term debt over assets. EBITDA/Assets is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization divided by total assets. Sales is the logarithm of net sales. All controls are retrieved for the year of entry in the sample.
ADR is anti-director rights index and CR is the creditor rights index. Country and industry (one-digit SIC code) dummies are not reported. Standard errors are reported in brackets. In column (1) Japan is excluded, in column (2) Canada is excluded, in column (3) manufacturing is excluded, in column (4) largest shareholders defined as mutual funds or banks are excluded, in columns (5) and (6) only financial sector is included, in column (7) ownership is defined at the 20% level of control and in column (8) ADR and CR are dropped. *** denotes 1% significant level, ** denotes 5% significant level, and * denotes 10% significant level.
(1)
Group -0.762*** -0.825*** -0.819*** -0.752*** -0.419* -0.777*** -0.813***
